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Book Review
THE REGULATORS. By Louis M. Kohlmeier, Jr. New York:
Harper & Row, 1969. Pp. xi, 339. Cloth: $8.95.
Few informed observers of the Washington scene, the regulators included,
will take issue with the thesis that our regulatory system is in serious trouble.
There are persistent, well-documented charges that the regulatory agencies
are failing to protect and promote the public interest; that they are failing
to establish standards and priorities for their actions, to maximize their
available resources, to understand the technology, economics, structures and
practices of the regulated industries, to coordinate their efforts and to ob-
serve procedural and even substantive requirements of the laws governing
their actions.1 The impact of regulatory deficiencies is being realized, with
increasing intensity, in terms of environmental hazards, transportation crises,
inflation and social disorder. Making our mechanisms for regulation and
planning more responsive, rational, and humane is a matter of utmost priority.
For that task, we urgently need insightful and empirically based studies of
the regulatory agencies and the problems they face.
Kohlmeier's book, which touches on a number of the valid points of
criticism of agency performance, purports to be such a contrbution: "a com-
prehensive evaluation of government's efforts of many years to regulate
and promote private industry for the public good."'2 The author's stated
purpose is to review, from a consumer interest perspective, "those laws,
policies and programs that are concerned with people's jobs and wages and
with the goods and services the public buys" 3-a promise surely impossible
to fulfill in a book that completely neglects such topics as the federal regula-
tion of occupational hazards, pensions, food quality, drugs, pesticides, auto-
motive safety, and advertising. Unfortunately, The Regulators is such a
superficial, uninformed, arrogant and ultimately naive attack on regulatory
agencies and on the very concept of regulation that it makes no meaningful
contribution to the resolution of the problems at hand.
1. See, e.g., E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULTZ, "THE NADER REPORT" ON THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969); R. FELLMETH, SURFACE TRANSPORTATION, THE
PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE ICC (1970); H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES (1962); J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-
ELECT (1960); J. TURNER, THE CHEMICAL FEAST (1970); REPORT OF THE ABA COM-
MISSION TO STUDY THE FTC (1969); Hearings on Economic Analysis and the Efficiency
of Government before the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic
Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 58-64 (1969) (FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson).
2. L. KOHLMEIER, THE REGULATORS ix (1969).
3. Id.
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Kohlmeier's talent is essentially that of a Washington journalist trained to
dig up enough facts and data to compose a presentable newspaper story.
There is no harm, to be sure, in retelling case histories of bureaucratic chaos,
ineptitude and corruption; indeed it is nice to have available the author's
concise and readable exposition of such episodes as the Dixon-Yates affair,
President Truman's covert intervention at the SEC on behalf of Wall Street
in opposition to a proposed ban of floor trading on the stock exchanges,
and the spectacular growth of the LBJ broadcasting kingdom. Kohlmeier
is particularly good in describing the discoordinated and irrational regulatory
actions which have impeded both competition and planning in the transporta-
tion industries. 4 If he had left it at that, one could have little objection to
this book. Unfortunately, the author cannot resist the temptation to go far
beyond the range of his abilities and experience, into proposals for massive
restructuring of the federal government, and the result is a disaster.
One of the central problems of this book is that Kohlmeier has done
virtually no hard, empirical study and analysis of the real structure and
workings of the agencies.5 We learn nothing of the motivation and aspira-
tions of the regulators, of how decisions are made (or not made), of the
barriers to coordination and communication, or of why the agencies are,
as the author charges, captured by the industries they were supposed to
regulate. Instead, a substantial part of the book is given over to Kohlmeier's
theory that legislation establishing so-called independent regulatory agencies
is unconstitutional, followed by a series of sweeping recommendations which
would abolish these agencies, turning over their functions variously to state
and local government, the federal executive department, a newly constituted
Article III court to be known as the Commerce Court, a beefed-up Antitrust
Division, and the Better Business Bureau. There is not much point at this
juncture in debating the issue of whether the independent agencies, not having
been expressly foreseen and provided for in the Constitution, are thereby
unconstitutional, largely because the question itself is so wide of the mark.
What Kohlmeier apparently utterly fails to recognize is that a substantial
part, if not the majority, of existing federal regulation is now assigned to
executive departments, and that the deficiencies and failures of the inde-
pendent agencies are repeated, if not magnified, in the agencies of the
executive branch.6 Whether or not the independent agencies are unconstitu-
4. For a classically near-sighted agency attempt to clear itself of Kohlmeier's
criticism, see "Is Regulation No Longer Necessary?" remarks of George M. Stafford,
Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, before the Board of Governors of
the Regular Common Carrier Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, February 20, 1970.
5. Cf. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969), a
brilliant and useful initiative toward an empirical reevaluation of the regulatory
process.
6. See generally REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES, supra note 1.
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tional, an issue I had thought to have been long since laid to rest,7 we must
deal with the massive problems that confront the government officials whose
duty it is to regulate corporate behavior and plan the rational development
and use of our public resources in the public interest. 8
I do not mean to imply that all of Kohlmeier's proposals should be re-
jected out of hand. Some of them-such as a major reinvigoration of anti-
trust enforcement, repeal of the Robinson-Patman Act, and the redistribution
of certain regulatory and planning functions-have been advanced by more
sensible and qualified critics of the regulatory process and are worthy of
careful consideration, but Kohlmeier's arguments are not convincing. Most
of his recommendations, moreover, are of the "out of the frying pan, into
the fire" variety, such as his proposal to transfer the Federal Power Com-
mission's energy regulation functions to the Interior Department whose own
ineptitudes (as evidenced by such regulatory disasters as the Santa Barbara
Channel bemucking, the Teapot Dome affair, the Farmington mine disaster,
and the work of the oil import administration) are of exponentially greater
magnitude than the misdeeds of the Federal Power Commission.
At the heart of his program for reform is an immensely naive faith in
"pure" competition as a faultless mechanism of consumer justice and social
planning. Kohlmeier provides no evidence in support of his hypothesis,
which seems to belie centuries of experience to the contrary, including the
very real abuses that inspired regulatory legislation in the first place. Kohl-
meier is undoubtedly correct in his assessment that big business would
strenously resist any efforts at antitrust enforcement which tended to threaten
the present complacency and "stability" of the American marketplace, and
he is also right, I believe, that such efforts would be a good thing for the
American consumer. He is wrong in his belief that antitrust-inspired com-
petition would be adequate to protect the public interest, and that federal
regulatory controls over corporate behavior would not be required. For
one thing, he overlooks the continuing abuse of the consumer and his en-
vironment by corporate predation in unregulated phases of the economy. A
good example is the problem of automobile defects and deceptive warranty
practices by the automobile manufacturers, as to which the Federal Trade
Commission has recently called for protective legislation aiming to "create
a meaningful mandatory, statutory warranty instead of the meaningless
voluntary, unilateral warranty now issued by the manufacturers, and would
obligate the automobile manufacturer . . . to stand behind his product and
7. See, e.g., ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894); cf. K. DAVIS, supra note 5, at
47-48. But see H. FRIENDLY, supra note 1, at 21, 22.
8. See Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227 (1966).
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replace or repair it without charge." Neither competition, self-interest, nor
corporate goodwill have in the past constrained manufacturers to protect
consumers, employees, or innocent bystanders from economic exploitation
or from hazards in their products and their production technologies. Philip
Elman, member of the Federal Trade Commission, has pointed out:
Competition does not inevitably take the form of a rivalry to pro-
duce the safest product. Indeed, the competitive struggle may
sometimes lead to a "shaving" of the costs of manufacture involv-
ing some sacrifice of safety. Nor does competition always reward,
in the form of greater volume and higher profits, the manufacturer
who tries to sell "safety" as a feature of his product.10
Another fallacy in Kohlmeier's ideology results from his failure to per-
ceive the impact of social, economic, and technological changes upon the
potential of competition as a device to accomplish rational resource alloca-
tion. Ours is an advertising age, and consumers make their choices of
goods and services not primarily on the basis of price or informed judgments
as to product quality, but rather on the basis of subconscious impressions
skillfully planted in a constant seduction through mass media. Donald F.
Turner, a former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Divi-
sion, has pointed out that advertising itself, which is the primary mode of
competition in many consumer industries, has seriously adverse effects on
competition" and other forms of nonprice competition undoubtedly have
similar impact. High profits in the production of such advertising-keyed
consumer items as drugs, packaged soaps, and automobiles have not led to
extensive entry by new competitors, nor to competitive price reductions in
these industries. Turner has articulated the problem as follows:
For heavy advertising expenditures may promote industrial concen-
tration in a number of ways. In a competitive industry we normally
expect to find firms entering and leaving the market during any
given period of time. Although the exit of firms will continue,
entry will be made more difficult as a result of the barriers cre-
ated through extensive advertising. To the extent that consumers
are unable to evaluate the relative merits of competing products,
the established products may have a considerable advantage and
it is this advantage that advertising messages tend to accentuate.
High entry barriers interfere with the normal process through
which increases in demand are met at least in part by new firms.' 2
9. FTC, REPORT ON AUTOMOBILE WARRANTIES 126 (1970).
10. "Safety in the Home: the Need for a Federal Hazardous Household Products
Act," remarks of Philip Elman, Briefing Conference on the Federal Regulation of
Product and Industrial Safety, Washington, D.C., February 17, 1967.
11. "Advertising and Competition," remarks of Donald F. Turner, Briefing Con-
ference on Federal Controls of Advertising and Promotion, Washington, D.C., June 2,
1966.
12. Id.
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Some of Kohlmeier's bizarre conclusions and specious reasoning make
it tempting to dismiss The Regulators lightly. It is, after all, unlikely that
experienced legislators or academics will consider his recommendations seri-
ously. Nevertheless, the author's shotgun attack on the agencies does strike
home on some important problems. Perhaps more significantly, Kohhneier
emerges as a kind of prototype7 consumer-victim. Here is a man who has
observed the agencies at close hand for years as a Washington newspaper-
man, who has had his fill of bureaucratic doubletalk, indolence, and deceit,
and who resents deeply the arrogance and unresponsiveness of the legal pro-
fession.
It is urgent for the professions to turn themselves with new energy toward
the problems of social planning and controlling corporate behavior. A new
empirical grasp of what actually happens in the administration of the law
is the first order of business. While we know that special interests have
taken over the regulatory agencies, we do not understand how their "daily
machine-gun-like impact"' s on the agencies and their staffs really works,
nor how "public interest" advocates before the agencies can negate or sur-
pass their influence.
REUBEN B. ROBERTSON*
13. J. LANDIS, supra note 1, at 71.
* Consultant, Center for Study of Responsive Law, Washington, D.C.; B.A.,
Yale, 1961; LL.B., Yale, 1964.
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